
Renewing Democracy in an Era of Globalisation: Negative and Positive Integration

THOMAS MEYER

Department of Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Dortmund

Summary

In his essay, the author refers to Jan Tinbergen and distinguishes positive from negative globalisation. *Negative* globalisation has been happening for the last two decades and is characterized by elimination of borders and bypassing the established regulation. This process hasn't been accompanied by new regulation on a global level. In this way, democratic theory had to face the challenge of *positive* globalisation and building of new forms of responsibility, regulation and orientation of values. In order to rediscover democracy, it is necessary to call for pragmatic *utopian realism*.

The author continues by presenting the overview of the different models of global democracy that are situated in different settings and are placed at different levels of political realism and achievability. Still, because of the unilateral action of the USA, this pragmatic utopian realism is of no real importance and it is only European Union and transnational political movements that can stand up against it.

Key words: democracy, global democracy, globalisation, negative globalisation, pragmatic utopian realism, positive globalisation, USA



Mailing address: University of Dortmund, Department of Social Sciences and Humanities, Emil-Figge-Straße 50, D 44221 Dortmund, Germany.

E-mail: meyer@fb14.uni-dortmund.de

Globalisation: The State of Democracy

The current stage of the interconnected twin processes of modernization and globalisation is marked by a variety of alarming characteristics that threaten the norms and standards of liberal democracy. Though globalisation as such is an extremely complex process that displays a variety of different and even contradictory features that by no means represent one directed tendency of development alone (Beck, 1997, Held/McGrew, 2000), some of its dimensions relate directly to the validity and reality of democracy. Most of those have been under discussion in political science and the

public since more than a decade (Held, 1995; 2000, Beck, 1998; Guehenno, 1999; Giddens, 1990, 2001). Among many others the most outstanding of those elements of globalisation that challenge the theory and threaten the reality of democracy directly are the following (Archibugi/Held/Köhler, 1998; Offe, 1999; Ruggie, 1999; Scharpf, 1999; Streeck, 1999; Held; 1995, 2000; Held/McGrew, 2000; McGrew, 1997, 2000; Meyer, 2001b):

- Whereas markets, environmental destruction, migration, organized crime, and electronic mass communication increasingly transgress all national boundaries, democracy and our political capacity to act in order to tackle these and other pressing problems are in substance still restricted to the jurisdiction of the nation state. Thus, democracy itself tends to become more and more powerless and, consequently, questionable in its own core claims.
- It was only the gradual cultural, social and ecological embedding of markets in the course of the late 19th and 20th century that have made capitalism in its various tamed forms more or less acceptable for democracy in Europe. But it is now exactly these conditions of being appropriately embedded that globalised markets are substantially stripped off. In addition national welfare states as the core parts of such democratic embedding come under increasing pressure as one of the external effects of economic globalisation in its present forms. Thus globalisation threatens to dismantle the very foundations even of those historical compromises between capitalism and democracy that European societies had succeeded to strike in order to secure their legitimacy.
- Both economically-dominated globalisation and market-led modernization of present day societies display a strong tendency to get more and more disconnected from basic human values and rights and the very preconditions for good life in most parts of the world. The shaping forces of this development lack guidance and orientation that could make them meet with the consent of the large majority of those whose lives are strongly affected by it.
- In general, as David Held has put it: “In fact, in all major areas of government policy, the enmeshment of national political communities in regional and global processes involves them in intensive issues of transboundary coordination and control. Political space for the development and pursuit of effective government and the accountability of political power is not longer coterminous with a delimited national territory”. What we are facing today is the new reality of “overlapping communities of fate” without a co-extensive overlapping of our polities (Held, 2000: 424).

In the terms of Jan Tinbergen we can say that in the course of the last two or so decades the world has passed through a prolonged period of largely *negative* globalisation which has been characterized in substance by tearing down boundaries and bypassing the established mechanisms of responsibility and regulation without building new ones at the global level that functionally could replace the old ones (Tinbergen, 1965). In terms of democratic theory the challenge thus posed is unambiguous: What is most urgently needed are new trans-national institutions, procedures and policies to bring the unleashed forces of modernization and globalisation back under political, and moreover democratic control, render them amenable to political deliberation, the rule of basic hu-

man values and political decision making power. On the agenda of democratic theory and practice is, therefore, a process of *positive* globalisation that proceeds by constructing new forms of accountability, regulation and value orientation in order to render the two realms of political problem causation and democratic problem solving capacity again sufficiently *coterminous*.

A Crisis of Legitimacy

In both academic and political discussions of recent years it has become obvious that the present world order, or in many respects rather disorder, in increasing measures suffers a risky lack of legitimacy. This legitimacy crisis is, however, by no means restricted to the realm of global politics. It affects likewise the internal condition of the national democracies irresistibly and increasingly because the global democracy deficit implies also their own incapability to keep major developments that affect the well-being of their citizens substantially under the control of their own jurisdiction. Both the lack of global democracy and the lack of effectiveness and reach of national democratic jurisdiction are just reverse sides of the same coin. One expressions of this being the growing protest movement particularly of younger people against the present mode of globalisation and its consequences for large parts of the world's population both in the South and in the North of the globe.

Regarding the issue of legitimacy it is consensus today that modern age standards of political legitimacy require two basic norms to be respected as soon as it comes to binding political action:

- 1) that all issues political in nature are to be dealt with in politically legitimate procedures;
- 2) that all such legitimate political procedures need to be based on the norms of human rights and democratic procedures.

Nineteenth and twentieth century concepts of democracy were based on the premise of co-extension between the twin arenas of political problem causation and political sovereignty of decision making (Held, 1995; 2000; Streeck, 1998). This was the widely accepted rationale of the idea of the democratic nation state. The nation state was expected to harmonize the three dimensions of a) the extension of the chains of political problem causation, b) the scope of addressees and b) the collective of authors of political solutions for all those problems political in nature. In order to define what is political in nature and what belongs to the realm of privacy two basic criteria emerged in the course of the 20th century (Meyer, 2002b):

- 1) All social actions that lead to rules and regulations that are binding for all members of a given society so that no space is left for them to opt out must be considered to be political in nature. There are basically two forms of such binding social facts: laws, rules, public policy outcomes and public goods on the one hand and external effects of societal or economic activities on the other hand that entail some kind of coerced consumption that nobody can escape.

- 2) Wherever basic human rights of groups of individuals are affected by the actions of other groups or individuals there is a case for legitimate political intervention. Thomas H. Marshall has demonstrated that the very idea of basic human rights cannot be restricted without severe contradictions to liberal rights (as freedom from illegitimate state intervention) and political rights only (to participate in the process of political decision making) but needs to be extended to the sphere of preconditions for free action (social rights, social citizenship) (Marshall, 1992). Thus the concept of basic human rights today combines in a post-liberal manner the three dimensions of freedom from the state (liberal rights), freedom in the state (political rights) and freedom through the state (social rights). Wherever human rights in this post-liberal broad sense are systematically affected or violated by the external effects of societal or economic action democratic a political response is called for.

Hence, legitimate political action – action to which all citizens, wherever they may live, have a basic right as citizens – in the world of today is required in all cases in which the two defined conditions for matters political in nature are met. In terms of modern norms of legitimacy this is the mark that needs to be targeted by the process of *positive* globalisation. The challenge for both democratic theory and practice is to find out in which formal or informal, institutional and extra-institutional ways this challenge can be met.

In sum: societal, economic or political actions that either cause unavoidable social facts or affect the basic rights of people need to be tackled through legitimate political procedures. In that sense it can be argued, as many authors did, that in an era of globalisation democracy needs to be reinvented. The often neglected point here, however, is that missing the mark of global democratisation implies a substantial measure of devaluating nation state and even regional state democracy was well, because in that case they will lose invariably their power of political jurisdiction. After the first two great historical transitions to democracy – first in some cities during antiquity in Greece and second in some cities during Renaissance in Italy – we are now facing a third historical stage of democratic transition – the globalisation of democracy (Held, 2000: 429; also Beck, 1998). Those chains of political effect-causation that transgress national boundaries need trans-national arenas for deliberation for all those affected and trans-national procedures for decision making and enforcement (Höffe, 1999). The future of democracy as such, not merely with respect to the legitimacy of the global order, is at stake.

Toward a New Utopian Realism. Competing Approaches to Global Democracy

Contrary to the position of the so-called *realists* in the field of foreign policy research I would like to argue that reinventing democracy at a global scale is by no means empty utopianism but, as Anthony Giddens has put it, needful pragmatic *utopian realism*. It is meaningful and necessary in order to provide guidelines for present day political action that is pressed by the needs of the day and the obvious legitimacy deficits of the given situation (Giddens, 1990). Moreover, relevant parts of the blueprint for a politically integrated world society are already visible in an embryonic way in present day

structures of trans-national political cooperation. They still do in their given shape, however, suffer from wide gaps, severe democratic deficits, unacceptable degrees of exclusionism and heavy unfair biases.

In current academic discussions of the problem of global democratisation there is widespread consensus on a number of basic issues but also dissent on a variety of open questions concerning the design, the ways of implementation and the purposes of global democracy. There is certain consensus that *co-extension* of the twin arenas of political effect causation and accountable decision making sovereignty needs to be regained through new forms of transboundary democratic procedures. A comprehensive strategy of positive globalisation as a gradual construction of world wide institutions, organizations and regimes of political deliberation and decision making is called for. On the basis of these shared convictions a variety of different responses to the challenge of globalising democracy have been advanced in recent years all of which claim to meet the mark of utopian realism in the sense that they demonstrate in normative terms what is both necessary and feasible in the globalised world of today.

Anthony McGrew distinguishes three, as he argues, clearly discernible models of global democracy: 1. *Global Governance*; 2. *Demarchy*; and 3. *Cosmopolitan Democracy*. Yet, as a fourth model the approach of the *Subsidiary World Republic* should be added. It is sufficiently different from the first three, cogently argued and not without some influence on political thinking (e.g. in the German Social Democratic party's political discourse). Each of these approaches is situated in a different tradition of political thought, entertains different ideals about the specific kind and role of required institutions and problems to be solved, and pursues a different path in conceiving the very norms of democratic decision making themselves. It might be added that they also seem to represent quite different degrees of political realism and feasibility.

1. The Global Governance Approach

The Commission on Global Governance in 1995 has coined the brand-name *Global Governance* to designate the specific model of transboundary governance that it proposed in its official report. This is a model of liberal-democratic internationalism that is marked by the following cluster of features:

- A set of pluralistic arrangements by which states, international organizations, civil society initiatives, movements and networks, international regimes (such as the WTO) and markets combine to regulate or govern certain aspects of global affairs.
- The proposed structures are not meant to work as fixed models and deliberately do not imply elements of world government or world federalism.
- The elements of this design interact with each other in a multifaceted strategy according to the demands of particular transboundary political issues.
- In order to make this process work the deliberate nurturing of a global civic ethic is topmost on the agenda.

- The effectiveness and inclusiveness of the United Nations and its sub-organisations needs to be enhanced.
- The United Nations institutional system is to be complemented by new forms of democratic institutionalisation such as a People's Assembly and a Global Civil Society Forum in which the world's peoples are to be represented more directly.
- An Economic Security Council is proposed to co-ordinate economic global governance.
- A right of petition to the UN-institutions for individuals and groups is to be established.
- A common world-wide enforceable set of global rights and responsibilities is to be institutionalised both to materialize and to strengthen the concepts of global citizenship.
- Regional systems of political co-operation like the EU, ASEAN, SAARC and the like need to be developed in all the world's regions and build in their turn networks of political cooperation among themselves.
- Citizens's participation at all levels of global governance from the local through the national and regional to the global is to be enhanced.

This model draws upon the tradition of political liberalism by aiming to subject the present rule of arbitrary power to the rule of law within global society. It stresses strategies of strengthening the representative and formal institutions of the UN. It is reformist in the sense that it pursues a strategy of incremental adaptation of the present embryonic structures of transboundary governance to the conditions of global accountability it prescribes. Underlying seems to be the assumption that the political necessities in a globalised world will drive forward the process of global governance through the irresistible power of their own weight.

McGrew classifies this model as a product of conventional liberalism for three different reasons: a) its inbuilt tensions between peoples sovereignty and state sovereignty in its concept of a people's assembly attached to the intergovernmental body of the UN general assembly in an ambiguous manner; b) its stress on formal and representative structures of governance and c) its separation of the economic from the political by envisaging only a soft form of economic surveillance through the conceived economic world council that would in effect entail a restriction of democracy to the political sphere (McGrew, 2000: 410). Another strong point of criticisms here is that the model does not provide any solutions to the problem that growing global interdependence unavoidably also leads to increasing global conflict.

2. The Demarchy Approach

A model of positive globalisation that has been exactly designed by its authors in order to overcome the perceived democratic deficits of the global governance approach is a communitarian concept of direct global democracy. It has been baptized by the authors as "demarchy" (Burnheim, 1985; see also Barber, 1995.). This approach stresses that real democracy in the global arena no less than in the national arena will only be feasible to the degree to which it emerges directly from the life, experience and the con-

ditions of particular communities. In the case of global democracy, however, the relevant communities will not in the first instance be local communities bound to a particular territory, but increasingly transboundary communities of interest or affection such as environmental, religious, gender, human rights and the like.

The basic features of this model are:

- The global construction of new forms of *functional* governance along the lines of particular policy arenas (environment, economy, trade, health, labour, gender, human rights, religion etc.).
- Transboundary procedures of direct deliberation and decision making in the respective areas that are embedded in active communities of interest and affection.
- No mediation of such decision making procedures through formalized representative political structures and bodies but direct accountability of the functional authorities to the affected communities.

“Democracy and democratic legitimacy are not to be thought in geographically-bounded entities like nation–states, but rather in functional authorities of varying geographical scope run by individuals selected by lot from among those with a material interest in the issue in question”(Dryzek, 1995).

- Preference for republican modes of self-governance in all the special interest realms.
- Creation of entirely new structures of democratic self-rule instead of transferring the problematic institutions of national democracy onto the global level.
- Preference for identifying and clarifying the normative conditions for true global democracy rather than designing institutions and blueprints.
- A revival of the polis-model of direct democracy along the new globalised lines of functional self-governance: management of the functional authority by committees that are chosen on the basis of a statistically representative sample from among the affected communities (even “by lot”).
- Co-ordination between the various functional authorities not by nation-states or other territory-bound transnational institutions but through committees of representatives from among all the functional authorities.
- The end of the nation-state and the very concept of political sovereignty.
- Power politics as we knew it will entirely be replaced by the proliferation of those diverse, overlapping and spatially differentiated self-governing communities of fate with multiple sites of power.

The model seeks a radical change both in the intra-national and trans-national modes of governance directed towards direct democracy. At the level of theory building it draws on the long tradition of theories of direct democracy and republican self-government. At the level of feasibility and political practices its hopes rest with the emergence and growth of new global social movements and citizens networks. The model is clearly biased in favour of normative demands trusting that patterns of success for action will emerge from the progress of practice itself rather than from preconceived theoretical de-

signs. The hope is that the proposed modes of self-governance are apt to bring the global economy under the rule of direct democracy too, and thus engendering economic and social equality around the world.

The first questions to be raised here are those of realism (powerless politics) and feasibility (institutionless politics) (see below in the chapter on the limits of civil society politics).

3. *The Cosmopolitan Democracy Approach*

British political scientist David Held has forwarded a model of positive democratic globalisation which he calls in the tradition of I. Kant's famous vision *Cosmopolitan Democracy* (Held, 1995, 2000). This model is – like the demarchy approach – meant to overcome the democratic shortcomings of the global governance concept but be at the time of a more practical nature than the demarchy approach. It starts from stating the undeniable basic fact of the world of today that humankind now is bound together both morally and materially in a “politics of spaceship earth” and, because of that, is badly in need to draw the necessary political consequences from this new reality.

Held's model is characterized by the following set of proposals:

- Underlying the entire institutional design is the expectation that a republican ethic of democratic autonomy is emerging and will motivate people not to act on the basis of their individualistic self-interest but in a spirit of responsible citizenship. Democratic autonomy here is defined as self-determination by persons who understand themselves as part of a wider collectivity whose democratic rules enable and constrain their own actions (Held, 1995: 23).
- Democratic practices thus need to be embedded within communities and civil associations but on this condition need to be globally extended through networks of agencies and assemblies that cut across spatially delimited locales.
- In striking difference to the demarchy model the approach of cosmopolitan democracy aims at framing such civil society activities with a rather dense system of globally binding cosmopolitan democratic law that “transcends the particular claims of nations and states and extends to all in the ‘universal community’” (Held, 1995: 228).

Thereby the model in this respect is based on a very strong institutional element of genuine supra-nationalism.

- Thus, both the informal political activities in the realm of transboundary communities and civil society politics on the one hand and in the realm of institutionalised national government policies on the other will have to take place in the shadow of binding cosmopolitan law.
- Such cosmopolitan democratic law shall not be established through structures of a world government or a federal global super-state but by “a transnational, common structure of political action” embracing all levels of, and participants in, global gov-

ernance, from states, multinational corporations, international institutions, social movements, to individuals (McGrew, 2000: 414).

- Cosmopolitan sovereignty in this way is based on a post-Westphalian cluster of “a global and divided authority system – a system of diverse and overlapping power centres shaped and delimited by democratic law” (Held, 1995: 234).
- This global authority structure is meant to be placed between federalism and confederalism as it combines the establishment of an overarching legal framework with self-governing political actors at all political levels.
- Cosmopolitan democracy means the end of sovereign statehood and the concept of national citizenship. Both shall, henceforth, be related to and defined in the framework of cosmopolitan democratic law.
- Cosmopolitan citizenship here is, however, not tantamount to some form of entirely informal citizenship as in some concepts of post-modern citizenship (Faulks, 2000). It is instead understood as multiple citizenship that brings citizens under the jurisdiction of several authorities at various political levels of authority and entitles them to participate in the relevant decisions at each level (Linklater, 1996).
- The establishment of cosmopolitan law itself is conceived to proceed through a reconstructed system of international organizations particularly a profoundly reformed UN-system. All these institutions need to be rendered more representative and more accountable by way of major reforms.
- Functional transnational institutions such as the WTO, the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund shall be put under the control of elected supervisory boards. The UN-General Assembly would be complemented by a directly elected “Assembly of Peoples” that serves as a second chamber. Referenda by the world’s peoples would be added.
- A global Human Rights Court would be put in place.
- Regional systems of political co-operation would be expanded, enhanced and democratised.
- The entrenchment of cosmopolitan law at all political levels would be guaranteed by the exercise of coercive force through new and accountable military structures at each level.
- A final and most crucial point that distinguishes this approach from the global governance concept is the prospect that the global economy shall in some way be fully embedded into the structures of political accountability and decision making and open to political intervention.

This approach is meant as a deliberate synthesis from a variety of traditions of political thought among which liberal democracy, direct democracy, communitarianism, and democratic republicanism figure most prominently (McGrew, 2000: 415). It aims at combining their respective virtues without sharing their flaws and shortcomings, be normatively most demanding and perfectly realistic at the same time.

4. *The Subsidiary World Republic Approach*

Eminent German political philosopher Otfried Höffe most recently has developed a model of global democracy that with programmatic intention is termed the model of *Social and Subsidiary World Republic* (Höffe, 1999). It is entirely based on normative considerations concerning the moral conditions of democracy in a globalised world. This approach has, surprisingly or not, met with remarkable resonance within the left wing of the Social Democratic Party in Germany. Though even this approach shares many of its features with most of the other models it is distinguished from all of them by its conspicuous stress on the imperative moral foundations of global democracy entailing highly institutionalised patterns of statehood. The steps of the argument are as follows:

- A highly interdependent world society in which everybody can always be affected in its rights and interests by the activities of everybody else irrespective of the location of either, necessitates the establishment of an enforceable universal law that protects everybody's basic rights everywhere.
- Universal law needs to be implemented and enforced by an impartial global authority as a necessary condition in order to be effective at all. Without such a formal authority no sufficient validity of the law.
- Such a global law-enforcing authority is only conceivable in terms of statehood characterized by institutions fit to exercise coercive power at all levels. Consequently global statehood in a globalised world is a moral imperative that springs directly from the validity of basic moral norms and human rights.
- As statehood under the cultural conditions of modernity necessarily needs to materialize in the forms of rights based democracy, a democratic world republic is the only morally appropriate and sufficient answer to the challenge of globalisation.
- The democratic world republic should, however, not take the form of a homogenous body but be differentiated in levels and sectors according to the democratic principles of federalism and subsidiarity. This principles delegate and restrict decision making power to exactly those levels and branches of the global state where it will respectively meet best the conditions of effectiveness and participation of the most affected citizens.
- A Subsidiary World Bank is to be linked to the global state structures and will have to exercise powers of surveillance and regulation over the world market.
- Whereas health and education policies, e.g., will still remain the nation state's responsibility, such policy areas as peace, ecological protection or the accountable regulation of the world market will be within the jurisdiction of the uppermost level of global sovereignty.
- Under the umbrella of the compulsory structures of organized world statehood there will, nonetheless, be ample space for a colourful bunch of diverse agencies of state-like or quasi-state-like character.

- The establishment of the new world republic can only be understood as a process of long duration. In order to support its progress it will be helpful to start with more modest forms of political confederalism and proceed only gradually toward fully-fledged federalism.
- The envisaged fundamental transformation of present time international political structures seems at the first sight to be rather utopian but will gradually proceed as it is driven by the superior force of moral necessity. Thus, the third democratic revolution will finally prove to be without a serious and justifiable alternative and in that sense be an ultimately realistic approach.

Höffe's model is constructed at the level of philosophical discourse and in its origins largely disconnected from both the political discussion and the discourse of political science in the relevant area. It is, nonetheless, cogently argued in terms of its own normative claims in the context of democratic theory and deserves thoroughgoing consideration, particularly with respect to the normative foundations of positive globalisation and the long term prospects of political institution building. It is obviously not meant as a contribution to the current agenda of transnational policy making.

A Model of Open Transnational Co-ordination. Toward a Realistic Synthesis

For an assessment of the suitability of the competing models respective to the challenge of global democracy under the given political conditions the application of three criteria appears to be fit: 1) their *normative sufficiency*, 2) the *appropriateness* of their political design and 3) the pragmatic *feasibility* of their design in the world we know. In comparing the approaches with the three criteria of assessment in mind I would argue that none of the models as such but an *Open Method of Global Co-ordination* which synthesizes some of their features whilst rejecting or omitting deliberately some others would best serve the purpose of guiding the process of positive globalisation with a maximum of political support.

An *Open Method of Global Co-ordination* draws, firstly, upon the broad scope of consensus and overlapping among all reported models of global democratisation:

- the basis analysis of the given situation: that both nation-state democracies and the global order are badly in need of some form of global democracy that is apt to bring about a new *co-extension* between transboundary political problems and political accountability;
- the concept of a new *cosmopolitan citizenship* that entitles and empowers citizens from all parts of the world to participate in political deliberation and decision making at all level of politics in a globalised world from the local through the national and regional to the global;
- the conviction that global democracy needs to target the *social, cultural and ecological re-embedding of global markets* and bring the global economy under effective terms of political accountability;

- the need to *reform the present day institutions* of international political coordination to make them more representative, accountable and effective;
- the distribution of a crucial role for *global civil society* networks in the process of global democracy;
- the advocacy of some form of *supranational* political authority;
- the conviction that global democracy requires the invention of a new type of *complex multi-level governance* with new forms of interaction between institutional and non-institutional political actors.
- most of the authors, with the only exception of Höffe, also agree that this shared vision of positive globalisation for reasons of political realism should *not* and for reasons of democratic subsidiarity must not be conceived in terms of a *world state*.

The synthesis represented in the approach of the Open Method of Global Co-ordination, secondly, stresses in particular:

- from the *demarchy* concept the basic ideas that the finality of global democracy needs to remain open and functional solutions to many of world democracy's challenges are most promising;
- from the *cosmopolitan* concept the twin ideas of an institutionalised cosmopolitan citizenship and the spread of supranational law;
- from *world republic* concept not the principle of statehood as such but the idea of a basically subsidiary form of global governance that includes certain limited elements of statehood (law enforcement, courts);
- from the traditional *global governance* approach the basic idea of an open multi-pronged approach that needs to remain open to pragmatic correction and incremental growth.

At the core of an Open Method of Global Co-ordination are six strategic pillars, their internal democratisation and their function-based interaction:

1. The concept of a rights and duty based cosmopolitan citizenship that entitles the individual citizen everywhere in the world to appropriate political action at the relevant political level – local, national, regional or global – and participation in the respective processes of deliberation and decision making.
2. The democratisation, complementation, enhancement and increased effectiveness of existing transnational and supranational political institutions and organizations, especially the UN and its sub-organizations. Particularly the establishment of a People's Chamber and an Economic World Security Council with powers of surveillance, framework setting and intervention are necessary.
3. The extension, intensification and internal democratisation of Regional systems of political co-operation such as the EU, ASEAN, SAARC, Mercosur, Nafta and the like and their networking as building blocks (Willy Brandt) of world democracy.

4. Stressing sector-wise functional global governance in relevant sub-systems such as Trade, Labour, Ecology, Health, Security etc. through building transnational regimes of sector-wise political regulation such as the Kyoto-Protocol, the World Labour Organization or the World Trade Organization and making them much more accountable, inclusive and democratic.
5. Giving the trans-national civil society support and additional politic weight with its more than 25 000 initiatives of today that cover all relevant policy fields from human rights and labour condition monitoring through environmental protection to gender equality etc.
6. Building a global public sphere both to foster the emergence of and give expression to cosmopolitan citizenship as the original source of global democracy: its legitimacy and its forms and functions.

The Limited Role of Civil Society

The demarchy theorists argue that because of the irreparable alienation of the given political institutions from peoples' aspirations, values and customs the main thrust for the necessary renewal of democracy in era of globalisation can only come from within civil society and be realized in its forms of organization and action (see also Barber, 1995). This would, however, mean to overstretch the capabilities of civil society and underestimate the role of binding decisions, power and sanctions even for a democratic political world order. The economic and social powers that have to be tamed in order to re-embed world economy in accordance with social, cultural and ecological standards require powerful state-like instruments of political implementation. In a realistic concept of democracy civil society cannot replace institutionalised statehood as such.

In the institutional dimension the role of civil society is indispensable but also clearly limited. It will have to play its crucial role in contributing to two particularly relevant functions of global democracy: first, defining the objectives and standards of global regulation and framework setting (re-embedding), and second, contributing to the monitoring and control of norm implementation in its capacity as part of what James Rosenau has called *spheres of authority*, i.e. clusters of experts, media, citizen's initiatives, institutions that emerge around particular policy issues like child labour, environmental destruction or the drugs trade (Zürn, 1998). In setting the goals of transnational regulation in a binding manner and in making their implementation work, more institutionalised forms of authority such as transnational organizations and the national state acting on their behalf will have to play the decisive part in any realistic concept of global democracy. What is needed for erecting such a legitimate world order today is consensus and power of implementation.

As it seems that less and less people accept that the answers to the challenges from globalisation must be left to markets what is also needed are models and concepts for a good life in order to give global governance meaning and direction. This is, as far as I can see, the driving force behind those young people who resist the present mode of globalisation. It underlies large parts of the activities of civil society world-wide and also citizen's movements in large parts of the developing world.

If we speak about reflexive modernization as a new stage in the historical process of modernization (Beck, 1997; Giddens, 2000) we are well advised to use the term as a call both for norms and for tools in order to give modernization meaning and direction, not just to designate a new level of complexity within the structures and processes of modernization themselves. The key question in this respect is where shall the ethical norms and values come from that will allow us to make meaningful use of the tools for controlling and shaping modernization? It is exactly at this junction that civil society proves to be an indispensable and crucial element of any meaningful concept of global democracy. Though the role of civil society in implementing democratic control over the processes of modernization and globalisation is limited, its contribution to building the values and creating the solidarity necessary for making the values powerful are crucial. The social form in which the domination free public space of civil society can be made use of to meet these ends is direct dialogue between citizens.

Civil society can play a key role in both approaches to positive globalisation: governance and value-building. It is simultaneously one of the tools of democratic regulation and the only available social space in which that kind of free and open citizens' dialogues can take place that are able to generate ethical norms and political values. At the same time those direct dialogue initiatives that can be used and usually are conducted in civil society have the potential to create not only consensus about norms and values for shared forms of life, but also the energies of solidarity and social capital that are necessary for their implementation in everyday life and in the field of political action (Putnam, 2000).

Facing Reality: The New American Unilateralism

Unfortunately, having developed so much of utopian realism it could appear that all this is just in vain in confrontation with the emerging new reality of the US-super-power unilateralism. This political turn apparently serves as a powerful, persistent and discouraging roadblock on all the avenues towards democratic global governance in which of its form so ever. In its present shape it works to dismantle the very prospect of the utopian realism of a world democracy based on multilateral co-operation and fairness. The incumbent US-administration has deliberately chosen to follow the strategic option of building a hegemonic unilateral political world order based on the twin pillars of a claim to possess a superior entitlement to world-wide legitimate action and on the brute reality of an absolutely superior military power.

The economic interests behind the Bush administration's rhetoric of global peace-keeping by a global war on terrorism are less visible but nonetheless of crucial importance for its design. The uppermost issues on the hidden economic agenda seem to be the worldwide enforcement of a Washington-consensus based liberal economy and the strategic control of the world's oil resources. The two generative ideas to legitimise the present unilateral strategic turn seem to be, first, the argument that only the US alone can guarantee security and peace in a stabile world order and, second, that domestic support by the US public and electorate are in the final instance a sufficient source for legitimising the US-governments worldwide strategic actions.

It seems that the present US-government to some degree can draw upon retrieved traditions from the early history's political culture of the US (Haller, 2002). The basic motives of the new ideology lie in an insistence that as the redeemed nation the US is both entitled and obliged to be also the whole world's redeeming nation. The incumbent US government acts under the impression that the majority support of the American voters who share this vision is a sufficient source of legitimacy in case other nations hesitate to join in. September 11 serves as a pragmatic proof that this strategy is without alternative in the world of today. There seems to be no space for multi-lateralism in the framework of this new thinking. Hence, all the projects for global democracy appear to be rendered obsolete in the light of this strategic turn of the only acting super power against whose veto and interest not much could be achieved. The record of recent years with the US-administration's denial of political co-operation in so many areas of security and environmental policy seems to stand proof of this expectation argument.

Yet, as I would like to argue, it would be a deeply flawed approach both in analytical and political terms to read these new developments in the light of some renewed versions of old fashioned theories of completely economic-driven imperialism, let alone "Empire". Though the economic interests behind the new US international policy may be strong and the cultural backing deep rooted there is no determinism at work here. The politics of earlier US-administrations and the emerging political opposition within the US itself demonstrate that what is at work today is a strategic political option of one coalition of interests to which there are alternatives that are not without chances in the near future. Students of the traditions of US foreign policy have argued, that both the scope for unilateral politics of the US-administration and of success for alternative options depend crucially upon the role the EU is going to take vis-à-vis the US and the global community. As David P. Calleo has put it: "It is not healthy for America's own inner balance to have allies incapable of looking out for their own interests. If the transatlantic balance is not restored by a strong EU, the United States will advance its unipolar fantasy, using its power to sustain its economy, and creating along the way the enemies it needs to fill its world view"(Calleo, 2002).

Feasible Prospects: Coalition for a New Multi-lateralism

The prospects for global democratisation thus depend upon the performance of the European Union and other relevant political actors in the global arena including new transnational political movements and their impacts on the US publics. From a realistic point of view there is a limited range of actors in the global political arena of today and tomorrow who can form a political coalition to promote the project of global democracy with sufficient measures of political support and power mobilization. Basically there are five candidates for such an alliance who have demonstrated in recent years that they will and can act – based on different but well-understood interests – to varying degrees in that direction:

1. Large parts of the international civil society including the responsible currents in the so called "anti-globalisation"-movement.

2. The globalist majority among the world wide social democratic movement and the related family of political parties (as organized in the Socialist International) including relevant currents among the US democrats.
3. The emerging players in the systems of regional political co-operation.
4. Some of the Third World countries and emerging new democracies.
5. The political mainstream and the large majority of national governments in the European Union.

It must be added, however, that the parties of international Social Democracy have not yet reached at a consensus on their response to the new challenge of US-unilateralism and neo-liberal globalisation. There is some probability that they never will in the foreseeable future. The large majority of the related parties, however, are – at least at the level of their programmatic liabilities – strongly in favour of global democratisation, global economic regulation, containing US-unilateralism and enhancing regional political co-operation. Yet, the parties of Social Democracy in Europe are at present time to a certain degree trapped in a strategic dilemma. Whereas in their programmatic discussions and commitments most of them endorse the idea that the extension, intensification and democratisation of democratic global governance is necessary in order to re-embed global markets under social and ecological standards they are much more hesitant when it comes to drawing practical consequences. At the level of action they usually meet with two major road blocs on their way. The first is the electoral situation that pushes social democratic parties to pursue the most immediate social and economic interests of their national electorate in the first instance. The other, once they are in office, consist in the necessity to come to workable arrangements with the dominance of the US-administration. From within their party organizations there is, nonetheless, constant pressure toward and in favour of global democracy and a fairer world order.

The European Union is the most promising actor capable of counterbalancing US-unilateralism effectively. Most of the member states are ready to move the Union's foreign policy in that direction. Contrary to a widespread opinion the underdeveloped military strength of the Union is no serious obstacle of such a strategy because under consideration is not transatlantic confrontation but a more balanced transatlantic partnership in leadership that could lead to a more participative world order (Czempel, 2002). The US-administration could dare no major military intervention anywhere on the globe if the EU does not comply in practical terms by sharing the financial burden, making its infrastructure available for the US forces and providing a minimum of legitimacy to it. It is in the vested economic, cultural and political interest of the EU to counterbalance US-unilateralism and work for the democratisation of the global order. The political model of the EU's own way from the erstwhile politics of confrontation of its member states toward an ever denser co-operation between them may as such serve as a paradigm of successful transnational governance – a model in which sovereign nation states retain their sovereignty and cooperate inter-governmentally where it makes sense but pool it and act supra-nationally where it proves necessary. The only condition that needs to be met is more unanimity in the EU's foreign policy combined with an organizational reform that makes it easier for the EU to speak with one voice when it comes to its relations with the US. This is no unrealistic hope.

References

- Barber, Benjamin, 1995: *Jihad vs. McWorld*, New York
- Barber, Benjamin, 1998: *A Place for us. How to Make Society Civil and Democracy Strong*, New York
- Barber, Benjamin R., 2001: How to Make Society Civil and Democracy Strong, in: Giddens, Anthony (ed.): 269-279
- Bergounioux, Alain, 2001: French Socialism and European Social Democracy, in: Cuperus, Rene/ Duffek, Karl/ Kandel, Johannes (eds.): 227-240
- Bertram, Christoph, 2002: Europe's Best Interest: Staying Close to Number One. <http://fesportal.fes.de/pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/POLITIKANALYSE/paxamericana/EINGANGSSEITE.HTM>
- Bresser-Pereira, Luiz Carlos 2001: The New Left Viewed from the South, in: Giddens, Anthony (ed.): 358-371
- Burnheim, John, 1985: *Is Democracy Possible?*, Cambridge
- Brown, Gordon, 2001: *Tackling Poverty. A Global New Deal. A Modern Marshall Plan for the Developing World*, The Transport & General Workers Union, London
- Calleo, David P., 2002: Balancing America: Europe's International Duties. <http://fesportal.fes.de/pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/POLITIKANALYSE/paxamericana/EINGANGSSEITE.HTM>
- Colome, Gabriel, 2001: Multiple Third Ways. The Spanish Case, in: Cuperus, Rene/ Duffek, Karl/ Kandel, Johannes (eds.): 199-216
- Cuperus, René/ Duffek, Karl/ Kandel, Johannes (eds.), 2001: *European Social Democracy Facing the Twin Revolution of Globalisation and the Knowledge Society*, Colofon, Amsterdam
- Cuperus, Rene, 2001: The New World and the Social – Democratic Response, in: Cuperus, René/ Duffek, Karl/ Kandel, Johannes (eds.): 151-170
- Czempiel, Ernst-Otto, 2002: Europe's Mission: pushing for a Participative World Order. <http://fesportal.fes.de/pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/POLITIKANALYSE/paxamericana/EINGANGSSEITE.HTM>
- Dauderstädt, Michael, 2001: *Ways, Byways and Third Ways to a Social and Democratic Europe*, Friedrich- Ebert-Stiftung: Series Eurokolleg 44, Bonn
- Dryzek, J.S., 1995: Political and Ecological Communication, *Environmental Politics*, (4) 4: 13-30
- Edwards, Michael, 2001: Humanising Global Capitalism: Which Way Forward?, in: Giddens, Anthony (ed.), *The Global Third Way Debate*, Polity Press, Cambridge: 384-393
- Esping-Andersen, Gosta, 2001: A Welfare State for the 21st Century, in: Giddens, Anthony (ed.): 114-133
- Faulks, Keith, 2000: *Citizenship*, London
- Feindt, Peter Henning, 2002: Neue Formen der politischen Beteiligung, in: Meyer, Thomas/ Weil, Reinhard, *Die Bürgergesellschaft. Perspektiven für Bürgerbeteiligung und Bürgerkommunikation*, Bonn

- Ferdinand, Peter 2000: *Democratization, Good Governance and Good Government in Asia*, Institute for East Asian Studies/East Asian Politics, University of Duisburg
- Gaerlan, Kristina N. (ed.), 1999: *Transitions to Democracy in East and Southeast Asia*, Institute for Popular Democracy, Queson City (Philippines)
- Galston, William A./ Kamarck, Elaine, 2001: Five Realities that will Shape 21st Century US Politics, in: Giddens, Anthony (ed.): 100-110
- Gamble, Andrew/ Wright, Tony, 1999: *The New Social Democracy*, Cambridge
- Giddens, Anthony, 1990: *The Consequences of Modernity*, Polity Press, Cambridge
- Giddens, Anthony, 1994: *Beyond Left and Right. The Future of Radical Politics*, Polity, Cambridge
- Giddens, Anthony, 1998: *The Third Way. The Renewal of Social Democracy*, Polity Press, Cambridge
- Giddens, Anthony, 2000: *The Third Way and its Critics*. Polity Press, Cambridge
- Giddens, Anthony (ed.), 2001: *The Global Third Way Debate*, Polity Press, Cambridge
- Giddens, Anthony, 2002: *Where Now for New Labour?*, Polity Press, Cambridge
- Habermas, Jürgen, 1982: *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, 2 Vls., Frankfurt/M.
- Haller, Gret, 2002: *Die Grenzen der Solidarität. Europa und die US im Umgang mit Staat, Nation und Religion*, Berlin
- Hardt, Michael/ Negri, Antonio, 2000: *Empire*, Cambridge/London
- Held, David, 1995: *Democracy and the Global Order*, Cambridge
- Held, David, 2001: Regulating Globalisation? The Reinvention of Politics, in: Giddens, Anthony (ed.): 394-405
- Held, David/McGrew, Anthony (ed.), 2000: *The Global Transformations Reader. An Introduction to the Globalisation Debate*, Cambridge
- Höffe, Otfried, 1999: *Demokratie im Zeitalter der Demokratisierung*, München
- Howe, Stephen, 2001: Travelling Theories and Multiple Third Ways, in: Cuperus, Rene/ Duffek, Karl/ Kandel, Johannes (eds.): 77-92
- Kapstein, Ethan B., 2001: The Third Way and the International Order, in: Giddens, Anthony (ed.): 372-383
- Kelly, Gavin (ed.), 1999: *The New European Left*, Fabian Society, London
- Latham, Mark, 2001: The Third Way: An Outline, in: Giddens, Anthony (ed.): 25-35
- Liddle, Roger, 2001: On New Labour, Neoliberalism and the Making of the Schröder-Blair Document, in: Cuperus, Rene/ Duffek, Karl/ Kandel, Johannes (eds.): 143-150
- Linklater, A., 1996: Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State, *European Journal of International Relations*, (2) 1: 77-103
- Marshall, Thomas H., 1992: *Bürgerrechte und soziale Klassen. Zur Soziologie des Wohlfahrtsstaates*, Frankfurt/New York

- Martenbauer, Markus, 2001: An Emancipatory Alternative to Neoliberalism, in: Cuperus, Rene/ Duffek, Karl/ Kandel, Johannes (eds.): 103-118
- McGrew, Anthony, 2000: Democracy beyond Borders, in: Held, David/ McGrew, Anthony (ed.): *The Global Transformations Reader*, Cambridge
- Merkel, Wolfgang, 2001: The Third Ways of Social Democracy, in: Giddens, Anthony (ed.): 50-73
- Meyer, Thomas, 1993: *Social Democracy. An Introduction*, Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, New Delhi
- Meyer, Thomas, 1998: *Die Transformation der Sozialdemokratie. Eine Partei auf dem Weg ins 21. Jahrhundert*, Bonn
- Meyer, Thomas, 1999: From Godesberg to the Neue Mitte. The New Social Democracy in Germany, in: Kelly, Gavin (ed.)
- Meyer, Thomas, 2001a: *Identity Mania. Fundamentalism and the Politicization of Cultural Difference*, Zed, London
- Meyer, Thomas, 2001b: *Soziale Demokratie und Globalisierung. Eine europäische Perspektive*, Dietz, Bonn
- Meyer, Thomas, 2002a: *Soziale Demokratie und Globalisierung*, Bonn
- Meyer, Thomas, 2002b: *Was ist Politik. Eine aktuelle Einführung*, 2nd ed., Opladen
- Meyer, Thomas, 2002c: *Media Democracy. How the Media Colonize Politics*, Oxford
- Meyer, Thomas/ Weil, Reinhard, 2002: *Die Bürgergesellschaft. Perspektiven für Bürgerbeteiligung und Bürgerkommunikation*, Bonn
- Owen, John M., 2002: Why American Hegemony is here to Stay. <http://fesportal.fes.de/pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/POLITIKANALYSE/paxamericana/EINGANGSSEITE.HTM>
- Pfaller, Alfred, 2000: *Social Democracy in the Globalised Post-Industrial Society*, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn
- Putnam, Robert, 2000: *Bowling Alone. The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, New York
- Scharpf, Fritz, 2001: Employment and the Welfare State in the Open Economy, in: Cuperus, Rene/ Duffek, Karl/ Kandel, Johannes (eds.): 63-76
- Stiglitz, Joseph, 2001: An Agenda for Development for the Twenty-First Century, in: Giddens, Anthony (ed.): 340-357
- Streeck, Wolfgang 1998: Einleitung, in: *Internationale Wirtschaft und nationale Demokratie. Herausforderungen für die Demokratietheorie*, Frankfurt/New York
- Svensson, Charlotte, 2001: Swedish Social Democracy and the Third Way – a Delicate Affair, in: Cuperus, René/ Duffek, Karl/ Kandel, Johannes (eds.): 217-226
- Szreter, Simon, 2001: A New Political Economy: The Importance of Social Capital, in: Giddens, Anthony (ed.): 290-299
- Telo, Mario, 2001: The European Dimension of the Third Way, in: Cuperus, Rene/ Duffek, Karl/ Kandel, Johannes (eds.): 171-186

The Commission on Global Governance, 1995: *Our Global Neighborhood*, Oxford

Tinbergen, Jan, 1965: *International Economic Integration*, Second, revised edition, Amsterdam

Zürn, Michael, 1998: *Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaats. Globalisierung und Denationalisierung*, Frankfurt/M.